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Abstract— The article discusses the problem of 
supply chain management in economy of Russian 
Federation. The institutional analysis revealed a trend 
towards the restoration of the supply chain 
management system that operated during the Soviet 
period on the basis of a transition to the manual 
economy management mode. The modern system of 
supply chain management of Russia has a number of 
differences from the Soviet model such as market 
pricing and distribution channels of the product, and 
it designed to implement the policy of import 
substitution in the Russian economy. The state 
corporation was chosen as the most appropriate 
organizational form to solve amassed structural 
problems. High risks of investing to the Russian 
economy, insecurity of private property rights, 
monopolization of certain sectors of the economy are 
creating an unfavorable institutional environment for 
business. Under these conditions, instead of 
expanding and encouraging the activities of private 
entrepreneurs, the state chose a different way to solve 
the structural problems of the Russian economy - 
withdrawing funds through taxes and distributing 
them through budgets of all levels to state 
corporations that are headed by the persons closest to 
power. The article shows that this path led to the 
restoration of the supply chain management system 
that was very characteristic to the Soviet economy. 
Since the experience of such management turned out 
to be negative, its repetition in the new market 
conditions is unlikely to bring a positive result, 
however, the government’s strategy does not provide 
for the possibility of replacing budget investments 
with private ones, as a result of which budget 
investments increasingly dominate, private 
investments are reduced, capital outflow is increasing, 
and the economy remains inefficient. 
Keywords— state corporation, import substitution 
policy, supply chain management, sectoral management 
1. Introduction 
State corporations have become an instrument of 
import substitution policy in the implementation of 
the manual economy management regime, the 
transition to which in 2007 marks a change in the 
logic of institutional policy. The gradual 
replacement of private investments with budgetary 
investments, the transfer of individual sectors of the 
economy to state ownership, in parallel with their 
monopolization, became the result of an 
institutional policy unfavorable to business. 
Insecurity of private property, high transaction 
costs, the rise of monopolies and the abuse of their 
monopoly position in the market force private 
business out of the Russian economy. The required 
structural changes need investments, which makes 
the budget the main source of funds for the 
economy. The development of budgetary funds 
cannot be carried out by private business, as there 
is mutual distrust between business and the state. 
Together, these problems lead to the need to 
change the structure of sectoral governance, where 
the main element becomes a state corporation. In 
fact, market relations are replaced by quasi-market 
under the management of persons designated by the 
state.  
1.1 The aim of the research 
analysis of structural changes in the management of 
sectors of the Russian economy 
1.2 Research objectives 
To determine the stage of transformation of supply 
chain management from the moment of dismantling 
the Soviet economy to the current state; to identify 
the main results of the transformation process of 
supply chain management; characterize the role of 
state corporations in the system of supply chain 
management of the modern Russian economy. 
For us it was especially important to understand the 
trajectory of changes in supply chain management 
after the dismantling of the Soviet economy. 
Institutional changes in the Russian economy left a 
unique imprint on the structure of the national 
economy, and it can be traced through the stages 
from 1991 to the current state. We came to the 
conclusion that the current state of the sectoral 
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management structure coincides in many ways with 
the sectoral structure of the Soviet period, which 
can be explained both by the effect of path 
dependence and the problems of ensuring the 
inflow of private investments and their replacement 
by budget ones. 
2. Materials and Methods 
In conducting the study, general scientific and 
special methods and techniques of economic 
research were used: a set of scientific methods of 
the abstract logical method; monographic and 
comparative, method of institutional analysis. 
Regulations allowed to identify the management 
functions that are assigned to public corporations. 
The laws of the Soviet period made it possible to 
identify the management functions and the 
structure of the sectoral management of that period 
to conduct a comparative analysis. Management 
functions characteristic of state corporations by 
virtue of current regulatory acts, management 
functions of enterprises of the Soviet period were 
analyzed in accordance with the hierarchy of policy 
planning. Comparison of management functions led 
to the conclusion about the similarity of the modern 
system of sectoral management and the system of 
the Soviet period. The differences are in the use of 
elements of a market economy, such as the right of 
private property, because their protection is 
provided more likely not by judicial authorities, but 
by proximity to power, that is, the property of 
public corporations is protected not by law, but 
rather by access to violence according to the 
methodology of [4]. The restoration of the sectoral 
management system specific for the Soviet 
economy carries with it the risks of ending 
economic development as well as during the Soviet 
period. Using the methodology of institutional 
analysis in terms of determining the coasian and 
pigouvian directions of institutional policy, allowed 
us to identify and justify the direction of 
development of the structures of sectoral 
management of Russian national economy. The 
question remains open as to when the new year of 
1991 will come for the national economy of Russia 
and the trajectory of sectoral management will 
change again. 
Some aspects of state corporation management 
were researched by Antonelli, Amidei, Fassio; 
Girma, Gong, Görg; Holland; Hu, Jefferson; 
Kurchenkov, Fetisova, Makarenko; Li; Menon, Ng; 
Murray; Nolan, Xiaoqiang; Soboleva, Bondar, 
Beskrovnaya; Tõnurist; Tambunan; Alhamrouni [1, 
-11]. Dysfunctions of public administration as a 
problem of economic efficiency and institutional 
policy we already published in: Silvestrov, Zeldner, 
Osipov, Katra [12-14]; also juridical aspects of this 
problem was researched in: Smorgunova, Dorskaia, 
Pashentsev, Pavlenko, Ignatieva [15]. Problems of 
Industry 4.0 implementation in emerging markets 
economies and also import substitution policy were 
described in: Bogoviz, Osipov, Chistyakova, 
Borisov; Sidorova, Osipov, Zeldner; Stroiteleva, 
Kalinicheva, Vukovich, Osipov, Katra, Zikai, 
Muhammad [16-19]. 
3. Results 
The internal management structure of state 
corporations, in contrast to the industrial ministries 
of the Soviet period, is characterized by the duality 
of subordination, which affects the quality of 
management of large economic actors. The 
enlargement of Russian industrial enterprises 
through vertical integration is caused by the need to 
form economic nets in production chains, which 
can solve the problem of coordination dysfunction 
in the system of sectoral management of the 
Russian economy [20-22]. 
Big business is a locomotive of innovative sector. 
There is the highest percentage of investments is 
observed in its sphere. In Russia, the segment of 
large companies (and most of them are state 
corporations) accounts for the overwhelming share 
of the economy - 79% versus 42% on average in 
developed countries. In addition, the state’s status 
of big business makes this group very attractive for 
innovation policy. 
Summarizing the shortcomings in the activities of 
state corporations, it is necessary to highlight the 
following: the growth of corruption and almost 
complete irresponsibility to the state and society, 
the weakening of the competitive environment, the 
exclusion of private companies from the industry 
sector, which could take a worthy place in the 
innovation process, inefficiency and conservatism 
of public administration and management of state 
corporations. So, gratuitous transfer of property to 
state corporations in the absence of proper control 
by the state contributes to the opportunistic 
behavior of their top managers. In addition, the 
latter have a real opportunity to withdraw public 
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funds for personal enrichment, which is achieved, 
for example, on the basis of concessional lending 
and subsidizing of state corporations and other 
forms of state assistance by overstating the costs of 
procurement, construction and repair. 
The monopolistic position of state corporations 
contributes to the conservation of the industry, 
undermines the economic motivation to 
continuously improve the efficiency of operation, 
to increase investment. At the same time, the nature 
of state property, which, at such a scale of joint 
appropriation, depersonalizes the owner, weakens 
the economic motivation of its subjects to the 
effective use of its facilities. In the absence of strict 
control by the state and society, all this is 
aggravated by the donation of property to state 
corporations. 
It should be noted such obvious miscalculations of 
the legal the status of state corporations, such as: 
• the insufficient degree of specification of the 
goals of their foundation, vagueness and too 
general nature of the formulations defining these 
goals, which creates a certain possibility of their 
distortion in practice, the arbitrary expansion of 
their composition, and also makes it difficult to 
monitor their achievement; 
• unjustified risks for the preservation and effective 
use of public property transferred to state 
corporations, generated by an excessive 
discrepancy, on the one hand, between the degree 
of liberalization of their rights enshrined in laws to 
be ordered by state-owned material and financial 
assets transferred to their property, and, on the 
other hand, the almost complete absence in the 
laws any norms that establish adequate to the scale 
of the state property is responsible for achieving the 
goals for which they were created, as well as for 
the effective use of state property transferred to 
them; 
• excessive, legally fixed degree of exemption from 
almost all forms of state control over the use of the 
enormous state resources submitted to them and the 
compliance of corporate activities with the goals of 
their creation; 
• the illegality of removing state corporations from 
the federal law “On public procurement”, which 
creates risks of corruption, since the order 
placement procedures used by corporations do not 
provide for transparency and publicity of their 
bidding, creating the possibility of a selective 
approach to the choice of suppliers; 
• negligence, vagueness and inconsistency of the 
legislative formulation of the property relations of 
state corporations, which consists in the illegality 
of their identification as the sole owners of the 
resources transferred to them. Despite the fact that 
the laws on the creation of state corporations 
position them as the only subjects of state property 
transferred to them, in fact, the content of the same 
laws follows: the partial rights of the owner of the 
resources of state corporations are also reserved for 
the government, which is prescribed by the same 
laws to approve a number of basic parameters of 
their activities determining the use of corporate 
property. 
The above-mentioned shortcomings of the legal 
construction of this legal form testify to the 
inadequacy of its quality to the serious tasks of 
mastering modern technologies and the 
development of innovative processes, the solution 
of which is legally charged to and included in the 
structure of the goals of creating most of the 
educated in 2007 state corporations. 
All of this is aggravated by the lack of effective 
control over the management of public 
corporations, an effective way to assess the 
effectiveness of their management, a high 
proportion of risk and uncertainty of investment 
projects and tasks set, the lack of sanctions for their 
non-implementation, and strict control over the 
spending of public funds. Moreover, the 
monopolistic position of state corporations 
contributes to the conservation of the industry due 
to the low motivation for effective investment. 
In addition, state corporations (among them 
Rosneft) demonstrate the highest level of 
remuneration of top management in Russia, which 
contradicts the very purpose of creating state 
corporations. So, in 2013, according to the rating of 
the most highly paid general directors prepared by 
Forbes magazine, the total remuneration of top 
managers at Rosneft for 2012 amounted to $ 292.6 
million. This company is no exception, in addition 
to it another 12 state companies with a 
remuneration of $ 226 million (in 2012, 11 state 
companies with a total remuneration of $ 147 
million) were included in the Forbes rating. 
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Private companies also pay fees, but they are 
significantly lower than state companies. So, in 
2013, according to Forbes, they paid $ 99 million 
(in 2012 - $ 97 million). For comparison, in the 
first half of 2013, the private oil company LUKOIL 
paid out bonuses to members of the board in the 
amount of 2.166 billion rubles. (69 million dollars). 
Possible recommendations for improving the 
management of public corporations: 
- the return to the state control functions for the 
activities of state corporations and their 
management; 
- the adoption of a unified code of rules for all 
management bodies of state corporations; 
- development and implementation of a 
shareholding program with the subsequent 
privatization of state corporations. 
It is necessary to improve the quality of 
management in state corporations, which is able to 
bring management decisions to implementation and 
exercise control over the implementation of these 
decisions at all levels. In addition, due to the low 
transparency of most state corporations and 
inefficient corporate governance in them, according 
to international corporate management practice, it 
would be necessary to increase the number of 
independent directors (at least a quarter on the 
board of directors) in a state corporation. However, 
if independent directors are dependent on top 
management in state-owned companies and state 
corporations, this measure may not always lead to 
the desired result of increasing the efficiency of the 
state corporation. Large-scale injections from the 
state budget should also be called a negative feature 
of the management of state corporations, since it 
seems more appropriate to direct these funds to 
removing administrative barriers for small and 
medium businesses, as well as reducing the value 
added tax, which has a destructive effect on 
production with deep processing of raw materials. 
and contributes to the primitivization of industrial 
sectors of the economy. 
4. Discussion 
Public administration, on the one hand, as a system, 
is a combination of elements (bodies, positions) 
and sustainable relations between it (provided by 
functions, powers, duties), but on the other hand, 
due to unbalanced and unsustainable relations 
between elements, strictly speaking the system is 
not consist. In our opinion, it is precisely the 
absence of separate links between the elements of 
the system due to their destruction during the 
beginning of market reforms in Russia, which led 
to the loss of controllability of the sectors of the 
national economy. The change in the socio-
economic structure and the transition from 
predominantly state-owned to predominantly 
private property on the basis of privatization led to 
the breakdown of nets in the production chains of 
the former sectoral structure.  
Privatization of individual enterprises changed the 
structure of the production cycle model, and due to 
weak competitiveness of products (most due to 
costly evaluation) and the abolition of the state 
monopoly on foreign trade operations, the former 
Soviet enterprises, being privatized, could not 
compete with foreign producers, and were forced to 
reorient focus of activities or significantly reduce 
the production of the former type of activity. This 
is precisely the reason for the closure of the 
majority of processing enterprises, factories of 
heavy industry, machine-tool production, and 
factories of light industry. They simply could not 
ensure profitability comparable, for example, with 
such type of economic activity as renting out 
premises or trading. In place of the old Soviet 
factories, markets, clothing fairs, and shopping 
centers opened up everywhere. The gaps in the 
production chains led to the fact that gradually, due 
to the “withering away” of the final producers, the 
previous links along the chain were gradually 
eliminated. The viability was preserved for the 
most part only by the first raw materials mining 
links. As there was no demand for their product in 
the country, they reoriented for export. So, 
gradually, due to the breakdown of industrial 
relations, the country became a supplier of raw 
materials and a consumer of imported final goods. 
At the same time, the state could not influence on 
this processes, despite appeals of opposition 
representatives due to the fact that the right of 
private property, including the possibility of 
independent determination of the market strategy of 
an enterprise. Government intervention would turn 
private property into fiction. In any case, in 
connection with the adoption of the Coasian 
direction of institutional reforms [13], government 
intervention would not fit the logic of the economic 
policy of the period 1991-2000. It is important to 
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note here that, although the right to private property 
was proclaimed, only a few citizens close to the 
first person of the state could de facto use it. Check 
privatization allowed all citizens to take part in the 
privatization of the national economy, but 
violations in the activity of check investment funds 
led to the loss of this right among the majority of 
the population. 
Disruptions in the production chains were reflected, 
naturally, in the destruction of sectoral 
management as a subsystem in the structure of 
government. 
The change in the components of the state sectoral 
management system led to the formation of a new 
national economy architecture in Russia, where 
extremely negative results are observed. 
This formulation of the question allows us to take a 
different look at the scientific problem of the 
development of sectoral management through a 
functional approach. The above logical conclusions 
lead us to determine which functions of 
government are provided with the necessary tools, 
which, in turn, will allow us to assess the quality of 
their execution. 
As it is known, A.Fayol distinguished 5 essential 
management functions: planning (foresight), 
organization, disposition, coordination and control. 
As a system of government in Russia, it is possible 
to implement these functions on the basis of the 
following table. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the quality of the implementation of functions in the system of public management 
Function Characterization of the quality of implementation in the system of state 
management of the economy 
planning 
(foresight) 
A federal law on strategic planning has been adopted, documents have been 
developed at the regional level, a transition to a program-targeted budget is under 
way, national projects have been adopted and are being implemented 
organization The system of state authorities is formed and organized in accordance with the 
constitution, the federal law on the government of the Russian Federation and the 
presidential decrees on the structure of the executive bodies 
disposition It is carried out under the authority of public authorities, on the basis of budgetary 
allocations and tools for managing state property 
coordination There is a development of this function in the new composition of the government 
through the empowerment and responsibility of vice-premiers in the areas [Osipov, 
2016], as well as through the project office. Nevertheless, it is here that the greatest 
failure is observed in the system of government in the framework of the functional 
approach. 
control is exercised by the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, law enforcement 
agencies, the President and the executive authorities within its competence 
The identified coordination dysfunction in the 
system of government, in our opinion, is the 
“Achilles heel”, which led to the loss of 
controllability of the sectors of the national 
economy.  
The coordination function needs a methodological 
support for its launch; otherwise, the public 
administration system cannot be considered 
complete, since functional links are not fully 
established. 
In the period from 2000 to 2007 manual control 
system was rejected by Vladimir Putin, President of 
Russia. This can be traced by his speeches at 
various events using the site www.kremlin.ru. In 
2007, especially towards the end, several 
unfavorable positions were formed for the country's 
economy. The decline in oil prices began to be felt 
(the main export commodity and the budget filling 
tool), the country became closely dependent on oil 
prices (this feeling arises precisely against the 
background of lower oil prices, and not during the 
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period of their growth), service the raw structure of 
the economy did not allow for quick maneuver and 
changes in the macroeconomic model. As a result 
of these factors, by 2008 it became clear that the 
service and raw materials model had exhausted 
itself, but no new model was proposed. But after 
2007, the situation changed and the mode of 
manual control system of the economy was adopted 
and is still in use. 
At a meeting with the business 12 years ago, 
Vladimir Putin said about the manual control mode, 
“that this is, in principle, possible.” It is safe to say 
that it was in 2007 that the idea to form a sectoral 
management system in new market conditions 
appeared, and the main role was assigned to state 
corporations as the basic elements of sectoral 
management in the national economy and, at the 
same time, a new intermediate level in the public 
administration system - between federal level and 
micro level (level of enterprises). When it came to 
implementing the May decrees of 2012, the final 
decision was made. May 7, 2013 at a government 
meeting, Vladimir Putin said: “One may argue and 
swear as much as possible about the so-called 
manual control method. But let us introduce such a 
system that works effectively. ” At the same 
meeting, the President heard the ministers' reports 
and distributed instructions to them. This, in our 
opinion, was the moment of final consolidation of 
the manual control mode as the main decision-
making mechanism in the field of economic 
development. 
Ignoring the name of the management bodies, let us 
turn only to the structure of the former (late Soviet) 
system of sectoral management and our modern 
system, which has been operating since 2007. 
 
Figure 1. Systems of sectoral management in the late Soviet period and in the period since 2007 in connection 
with the formation of state corporations
The left part of Figure 1 shows the organizational 
structure of sectoral industrial management in the 
USSR, and the right-hand side shows the structure 
of management in modern period. In the Soviet 
period, the industrial ministry was the central 
government body that managed one of the 
industries. Republican industrial trust or alliance - 
the middle link of the organizational structure of 
the industry; can cover the sub-industry level on the 
scale of the Union, republic or a particular region. 
Production and scientific production associations 
are the main link of the sectoral management 
system, which has an independent balance sheet, 
which has the rights of a legal entity, and is 
subordinated to the Republican industrial trust or 
alliance. 
In 2007, with the formation of the State 
Corporation to promote the development, 
production and export of high-tech industrial 
products Rostec in connection with the adoption of 
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the Federal Law of November 23, 2007 No. 270-
ФЗ “On the State Corporation “Russian 
Technologies””, it became clear that model of 
national economy management in the country is 
changing. It was during this period that the 
President of Russia began to gradually introduce 
the manual control system as we noticed earlier. 
Until 2007, the direct question about the 
introduction of the manual control mode was 
always followed by a negative answer. In 2007, 
cautious exponentiation of public opinion began, 
and the idea was carefully expressed that it might 
make sense to think about manual control. And 
with the introduction in 2007 of the six federal laws 
on state corporations, the idea of manual 
management of the economy is already becoming a 
reality, and as we noted above, already in 2013, the 
regime received final consolidation. 
It is important to note that manual control is not a 
negative or positive phenomenon in the economic 
life of a country. This is a long-known method of 
economic management, since almost all countries 
used manual control, starting with England in the 
18th century, the USA after the “Great 
Depression”, Japan, France, South Korea and 
others. Most often, this was resorted to in adverse 
economic conditions. Practically everywhere, the 
mode of manual control of the economy gave 
positive results. It is based on the idea of a 
protectionist policy - supporting national producers. 
The establishment of a sanction regime against 
Russia forced us to look for new ways to 
effectively manage the economy, and as a result, 
the process of import substitution began. 
Import substitution relies on the manual control 
mode, as the economy needs a radical restructuring 
of existing ties, relationships, ways of interaction. 
The policy of import substitution, as historical 
experience has shown, is carried out by successive 
transition through three stages. The first stage is 
characterized by the closure of domestic markets 
and the creation of conditions for the organization 
of import-substituting industries. At the second 
stage, domestic producers are determined that are 
capable of producing more or less high-quality 
products. Such enterprises receive state support to 
ensure output to the level of world standards. At the 
third stage, the cultivation of "national champions" 
- companies that are capable of international 
competition in the foreign market. 
 
 
Figure 2. Stages of import substitution policy 
Although the policy of import substitution began to 
manifest itself in full force only in 2014, but in 
2007 it became clear that it was not easy to win 
international competition in the domestic market, 
and it was difficult to even think about the external 
markets. However, in 2007, sectoral management 
of industry was organized on a new basis. The 
formation of large industrial conglomerates was 
supposed to restore economic nets between 
enterprises through the restoration of vertical 
management. The most striking example of such a 
vertical structure, in our opinion, is state 
corporation Rostec. Its annual reports clearly 
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demonstrate the implementation of the policy of 
import substitution. 
If we compare the systems of organization of 
sectoral management in the USSR and modern 
Russia, then there will be quite a lot of similar 
positions, as follows from Figure 1. Firstly, it is 
obvious that the structures have similar levels of 
control, both in number and in functionality. 
Secondly, the main decision-making mechanism in 
both cases is the vertical from top to bottom. 
Thirdly, there is a similarity in budgeting systems - 
targets that are directed from top to bottom in a 
prescriptive mode. 
However, the differences should be taken into 
account. In the past, the methods of the 
administrative system were used instead of market 
pricing, which distorted the totality of economic 
relations. In modern Russia, market pricing makes 
it possible to use resources more efficiently and 
distribute products, which obviously adds stability 
to the modern management structure of the national 
economy sectors. 
The conclusion that follows from figure 1 is 
obvious, since 2007, the country began the period 
of restoration of the sectoral management system 
along the lines of the late Soviet model, but it was 
based on market instruments. 
An important point in the study seems to us the fact 
of a change in the direction of institutional policy 
from coasian to pigouvian in terms of sectoral 
management, but, as always, with Russian 
specifics. 
Pigouvian type of institutional policy provides for 
the creation of a set of institutions that contribute to 
the independent choice of an enterprise 
development strategy based on the state provided 
certain incentives in economic policy (for example, 
French economic policy with a central super-
ministry of economy, or EU agrarian policy, in 
both cases are the type of indicative planning which 
provides a coordinating function on a market basis 
using tools cops promote and encourage the desired 
behavior economic actors). Coasian type involves 
solving three institutional tasks: limiting 
monopolistic activity, reducing transaction costs 
and protecting private property rights. When these 
problems will be solved, market relations will be 
established, and all other problems of economic 
development will be resolved without state 
participation on the principles of self-organization. 
The second path was chosen at the beginning of 
market reforms in Russia, propagated 
unsuccessfully until 2007, but after adopting the 
manual control mode, the transition to the 
Pigouvian recipes was carried out gently. 
Unfortunately, the transition was not complete, 
which created a certain lag between the 
propagandized regime and the real implementation 
of economic policy. 
The provision of a coordination function needs a 
manual control toolkit, which currently focuses 
more on object management, when the efforts of 
the controlling subject are directed to the solution 
of specific short-term operational issues. It is 
necessary to consider the possibility of 
systematizing the manual control and the soft 
direction of actions of all objects of management in 
the necessary strategic key on the basis of 
indicative plans. It is obvious that Coasian recipes 
can be effective in mature capitalist systems, 
whereas for developing markets with traditionally 
strong state participation in economic relations, 
preference should be given to Pigouvian ones. 
Coordination through Piguvian type, due to the 
gauge effect, will not allow skipping over the 
stages of development of the economic system, 
which means that attempts to impose Coasian 
recipes will lead to the obligatory mutation of 
adopted institutions. Attempts to embedding 
Coasian receipts, bypassing the stage of Pigouvian 
at the beginning of market reforms in Russia, led to 
the state’s withdrawal from regulating the process 
of transition to market relations. 
The resulting vacuum authorities tried to fill the 
various bandit groups. That is why, by 2007, it 
became clear that the mode of manual control of 
the economy is desirable. The self-organization of 
market relations did not occur, and the institutions 
that were previously embedded in accordance with 
Coase’s theory were mutated. 
Pigouvian recipes can change the organization of 
economic relations, but this requires a sustained 
commitment of the authorities to the policy of 
import substitution. However, at present there is 
more likely a departure from it and a return to the 
idea of market self-organization. Thus, the 
formation of state corporations was a landmark 
event in changing the logic of economic policy, 
but, at the same time, a turn away from the policy 
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of import substitution marks a return to the co-
development path. Such indecisiveness or 
variability of the logic of economic policy affect 
the investment process, because economic actors 
are very sensitive to changes in economic policy, 
especially in countries with developing markets and 
a strong state. 
In our opinion, it is important to consider the 
management systems in modern state corporations 
and industrial ministries of the former USSR in 
order to determine the degree of similarity of the 
internal organization of sectoral management. 
Thus, in the management system of state 
corporations and, accordingly, control, there is a 
“dual power”, which is confirmed by the analysis 
of the relevant federal laws. Thus, federal law No. 
107-FZ “On the Russian Corporation of 
Nanotechnologies” (as amended on May 31, 2010) 
in Article 6 “The Relationship of the President of 
the Russian Federation, State Authorities and Local 
Governments with the Corporation: 1) The 
President of the Russian Federation appoints 
position and relieve the Director General of the 
Corporation, and the Government of the Russian 
Federation appoints and dismisses members of the 
Supervisory Board of the Corporation, determines 
the amount of remuneration of the General Director 
of a Corporation and the terms and conditions of 
investment of temporarily free funds of the 
Corporation and its maximum size" 
The report of the Corporation is sent to the 
Government, the aggregated data of the annual 
report, and the report on the results of the 
monitoring are sent to the President (Article 7 p.4-
5). Further, the supreme body of a state corporation 
- the supervisory board - five members are 
appointed by the President, five members - by the 
Government, two members by the State Duma of 
the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. 
There are similar elements of double control in the 
state nuclear corporation Rosatom. In accordance 
with the Federal Law on State Corporation 
“Rosatom” dated December 27, 2017 No. 541-FZ 
in Article 5 “Powers of the President of the Russian 
Federation and the Government of the Russian 
Federation in relation to the Corporation”, the 
President approves the list of joint-stock companies 
that are federal property shares to be transferred to 
the state corporation as a property contribution of 
the Russian Federation, the list of federal unitary 
enterprises to be transferred to the corporation. The 
president appoints the chairman and members of 
the supervisory board, as well as the general 
director. The government also approves the 
procedure for transferring the property contribution 
and a list of federal property, a list of federal 
government agencies transferred to the corporation. 
At the same time, the order of transactions with 
shares is distributed among the institutions of 
government. 
In May 2007, the Government of the Russian 
Federation by Decree No. 310 of May 26, 2007 
“On Measures for the Establishment of the Open 
Joint-Stock Company Atomic Energy and 
Industrial Complex, which was included in 
Rosatom in the same year. In the section on the 
legal status of the company, the statute of the 
Atomic Energy and Industrial Complex Open Joint-
Stock Company stresses that: “The Company, as 
well as its subsidiaries and affiliates make 
transactions related to alienation, alienation or 
transfer to trust management of their shares: of 
joint-stock companies included in the lists of 
Russian legal entities approved by the President of 
the Russian Federation in accordance with the 
Federal Law “On the Use of Atomic Energy” five 
of which are nuclear materials, nuclear installations 
- only with the consent of the President of the 
Russian Federation; and shares made in accordance 
with the decision of the Government of the Russian 
Federation to the authorized capital of the 
company, only with the consent of the Government 
of the Russian Federation. Transactions made 
without such consent are void”. 
Federal Law on the State Corporation “Rostec” No. 
270-FZ of November 22, 2007 in the article “The 
Supervisory Board of the Corporation”, which acts 
as the supreme governing body of the corporation, 
also identifies a dual approach to management. The 
supervisory board of the Corporation includes 11 
members: four representatives of the President, two 
represent the business community and the general 
director, a member of the supervisory board 
according to their positions, who are appointed by 
the President of the Russian Federation, the rest are 
the prerogative of the Government. 
The industrial ministries of the former USSR were 
organized on the principle of unity of command, 
the minister was personally responsible for the state 
of affairs in the industry entrusted to him. 
Collegiums were formed in each ministry (about 15 
people), the composition of which was approved by 
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the USSR Council of Ministers. The Republican 
production alliances were also headed by the head 
on the principles of unity of command, but the 
board of directors operated with it. Thus, in the 
Soviet period, management in the sectors was 
formed on the basis of unity of command, without 
any duality, which not only increased the 
responsibility of decision-makers, but also 
strengthened the vertical management of the 
industry. This not only allowed more efficient use 
of resources, but, in contrast, made such structures 
less flexible. However, flexibility in the situation of 
the administrative system replacing the market was 
not required. 
As can be seen, in state corporations that determine 
the innovative and technological development of 
the country, control over their activities is not 
sufficiently centralized. Developing a model of 
innovative development of the country is the 
prerogative of researchers, not of large managers. 
The insufficient quality of management in state 
corporations is determined by the following: the 
vagueness of the goals of the state as an owner; 
inconsistency of interests of the state and private 
investors; failures in developing a unified position 
of various state bodies in relation to state-owned 
companies; weak responsibility of state bodies and 
managers for the efficient use of state property; the 
insufficient contribution of the boards of directors 
and representatives of the state on these boards to 
ensure high-quality corporate governance in state-
owned companies. 
Management in state corporations, in which huge 
assets, budgetary funds and lending opportunities 
are concentrated, should be clearly focused on the 
achievement of final results at the expense of the 
latest technological solutions, and here it is 
necessary to introduce control over the 
achievement of targets and personal responsibility 
of managers. 
5. Conclusion 
Institutional analysis in our research shows, that 
modern stage of economic development of the 
Russian Federation can be characterized as 
restoration of late Soviet system of sectoral 
management. According with changes in 
institutional policy from coasian receipts to 
pigouvian ones in frame of import substitution 
policy and broken links and nets in frame of 
production chains it was necessary to find a 
mechanism of organizing production chains on the 
basis of market economic laws. We notice the great 
role was given to state corporations as budget 
actors of sectoral management. Of course, budget 
investments instead of private is a step out from 
market economy, but without strong links and nets 
between enterprises it is impossible to build strong 
economics too. This dichotomy partially justifies 
the creation of state corporations as new strong 
actors in economic activity. From the other hand, as 
we noticed, it is better to decide a problem of 
monopole position of state corporations in some 
sectors, to solve a task of duality in their 
subordination and weak control from the side of 
state.  
Any way state corporations are the reality of 
Russian economy for nowadays, and hopefully, 
some day they will be share and privatized on the 
basis of law, without criminal aspects and for real 
market prices. 
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